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Neither Big Brother Nor Dead Brother:
The Need for a New Fourth Amendment Standard
Applying to Emerging Technologies
Casey Holland'
On each landing, opposite the lift shaft, the poster with the enormous face gazed
from the wall. It was one of those pictures which are so contrived that the eyes follow
you about when you move. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption beneath it
ran ....
... The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that Win-
ston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it; moreover,
so long as he remained within the field of vision which the metalplaque commanded,
he could be seen as well as heard. ... How often, or on what system, the Thought
Police pluged in on any individual wire was guesswork.I
-George Orwell, 1984
We're talking about the balance between privacy, on the one hand, and protection
from Big Brother government, but we're also talking about the government's respon-
sibility to protect our people. It comes down to the choices, my staff has said to me
many times, between BigBrother and dead brother Andl think ourfirst responsibil-
ity in government is to make sure we don't have any more dead brothers.3
-Porter Goss, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
B IG BROTHER casts an ominous shadow over any new type of surveillance
technology.4 Often, privacy advocates view technical advancements in
I J.D. expected 2oo6, University of Kentucky; B.A., Political Science, University of
Kentucky, 2003. I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the following: Dr, Bradley
Canon, for supporting my first forays into Fourth Amendment issues; Prof. William Fortune,
for his helpful comments and encouragement on an early draft; my colleagues on the editorial
board of the Kentucky Law Journal, for their tireless assistance in making this a better piece;
and my father, Archie Holland, for answering an unending stream of questions about network
architecture.
2 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 5-6 (Signet Classic 2oo0) (1949).
3 All Things Considered: Profile: Porter Goss is Nominated to be Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (National Public Radio broadcast Aug. 10, 2004).
4 Both the Supreme Court and commentators have proven remarkably prescient on this
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monitoring as Orwellian evils.5 Concurrently, law enforcement and anti-ter-
rorism advocates routinely see the lack of expanded technological means
of covert observation as an invitation to utter disaster.6 This Note posits
that there is an alternative to the Big Brother-dead brother diametric view;
that emerging technologies can be used to protect national security without
endangering longstanding constitutional values.
Due to the nature of scientific development, the controversy over
emerging surveillance technologies is a relatively recent one. For decades,
the paradigm of law enforcement's use of investigatory devices was the
classic wiretap. 7 Since then, electronic innovations have launched a revolu-
tion in the use of digital devices to observe and record the activities of oth-
ers. Pen register/trap and trace devices,' digital pager clones,9 keylogging
point. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely
to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the government, with-
out removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home."); see also CONFERENCE
ON THE BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, FINAL REPORT 2 (1972) (Samuel Alito,
chairman), http://www.epic.orglprivacy/justices/alito/reportI0205.pdf ("The cybernetic
revolution has greatly magnified the threat to privacy today... .The potentional for invasion
of privacy through the use of computers is growing rapidly.... Centralization, the creation of
vast computer networks, opens the possibility of bringing together an enormous amount of
information about every facet of an individual's life."); Alan E Westin, Science, Privacy, and
Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, IO06-08 (1966), excerpted in
RICHARD C. TtJRKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 82-83 (1999)
(describing numerous developments in surveillance technology); Samuel D. Warren & Louis
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 195 (189o), excerpted in TbRKINGTON &
ALLEN, supra, at 30 ("Recent inventions.., call attention to the next step which must be taken
for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls
the right 'to be let alone."'). The Warren and Brandeis article later provided the foundation
for the recognition of tortious invasion of privacy claims. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652A cmt. a (1977).
5 See, e.g., Security and Liberty: Protecting Privacy, Preventing Terrorism: Hearing Before the
Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 1o8th Congress 1 (2003) (statement
of Marc Rotenberg, President, Electronic Privacy Information Center), http://www.epic.org/
privacy/terrorism/9I icommtest.pdf (referring to "Big Brother databases").
6 See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text.
7 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456-57; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967)
(Congress codified the Katz principles in the Electronic Comminucations Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2510 (1968)).
8 See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, I61 (1977); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 737 (1979), superseded by statute, Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices, Pub. L. No.
99-508, Title III, § 30I(a), Io Stat. 1871 (Oct. 21, 1986). A pen register is "a device or process
which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted,"
while a trap and trace is "a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other
impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and sig-
naling information." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(a) (2000).
9 See Brown v. Waddell, 50 F3d 285, 287 (4th Cir. 1995). A digital pager clone is a device
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programs,' 0 packet-sniffing systems," and biometric identifiers2 have all
become fairly common tools of law enforcement agencies. The reason that
so many digital surveillance techniques have developed in recent years is
simple: as a tool for both common criminals and international terrorists, the
Internet has exploded as the primary means of communications.' 3 Child
pornographers, mobsters, con men, and even terrorists have turned to the
Internet for anonymity and safety from investigatory agencies.'4 It is a tru-
ism that some form of electronic communications surveillance is necessary
not just to investigate criminal behavior but to prevent future terrorist at-
tacks. The Supreme Court itself recognized this decades ago:
The marked acceleration in technological developments and sophisti-
cation in their use have resulted in new techniques for the planning, com-
mission, and concealment of criminal activities. It would be contrary to the
public interest for Government to deny to itself the prudent and lawful
employment of those very techniques which are employed against the Gov-
ernment and its law-abiding citizens.' s
Of course, a rift emerges with respect to the specific surveillance utilized
and its method of utilization. As a philosophical matter, the Orwell-Goss
division generally falls into a classical libertarianism-communitarianism
structure, the former valuing individualism and personal autonomy, the lat-
ter primarily concerned with social responsibility and the common good.'6
to "monitor numeric messages received" on another's pager. Id. at 286.
In See United States v. Scarfo, 18o F Supp. 2d 572, 574-75 (D.N.J. 2001). Keyloggers
include such systems as the FBI's "Magic Lantern," a "virus-like program" that records key-
strokes and can hence be used to discover encryption passwords. See James Adams, Suppressing
Evidence Gained by Government Surveillance of Computers, 19 CRIM. JUST. 46,48-49 (2004).
I I See generally Casey Holland, The Carnivore Internet Monitoring Device: Capabilities,
Statutory Framework, and Constitutional Considerations, excerpted in 2 KALEIDOSCOPE: U. Ky. J.
UNDERGRADUATE SCHOLARSHIP 34 (2OO3), available at http://www.uky.edu/Kaleidoscope/
fallzoo3/Oswald/holland-article.pdf. Packet sniffers are either hardware or software that re-
cord digital information transmitted over a computer network. For definitional purposes only,
packet sniffers as Internet surveillance devices are roughly analogous to traditional wiretaps
on telephone lines. See id. at 4-5.
12 See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 115-20 (i999). A biometric identifier
"analyzes and measures unique physiological or biological characteristics" for identification
purposes. Id. at 115 (internal citation omitted).
13 See The "Carnivore" Controversy: Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in the Digital
Age: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Io6th Cong. 9
(2ooo), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1o6_senate_
hearings&docid=f:74729.pdf (statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Hearings].
14 See id. at 9-lo.
15 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972).
16 Seegenerally ETZIONI, supra note 12; see also Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological
Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing, andthe Internet, 57 VANO. L. REV. 965,975-79 (2004) (describ-
2oo5-zoo6]
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As a constitutional matter, the same schism is primarily addressed in one
context: the Fourth Amendment.' 7 Unfortunately, as is so often the case
with questions of constitutional interpretation, the Fourth Amendment
offers no easy answers to the question of whether new surveillance tech-
nologies can be used by law enforcement without a warrant.'8 Part I of this
Note will examine the various ways in which new law enforcement tools
and techniques have been analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and ad-
dress the benefits and detriments of evaluating emerging technologies un-
der each constitutional standard.' 9 Part II will apply the various standards
to a test case, the monitoring of electronic mail ("e-mail").20 Finally, Part
III will propose a new, merged standard that will satisfy the concerns of
both privacy advocates and law enforcement officials.- This merged stan-
dard will provide strong protections for individual privacy while offering
the flexibility necessary to adequately protect national security. By putting
forward such a proposal, this Note offers an alternative that is neither Big
Brother nor dead brother but is a median approach repudiating both.
I. CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS
APPLYING TO EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Generally speaking, there is only one Fourth Amendment search and sei-
zure requirement and that is reasonableness.12 However, under the general
ing the competing liberal and communitarian "meta-narratives"). Of course, this is an essen-
tialized version of the philosophical debate over privacy and countless other viewpoints exist.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privay, REGULATION, May/June 1978), at
19-26 (describing a right of privacy centered around economic concerns). It should be noted
that this Note adopts a somewhat Rawlsian approach, implicitly positing that the best way to
ensure both privacy and security is to balance the libertarian and communitarian approaches
without presuming one's societal position. SeeJoHN RAWLS, A TIiEORY OF JUSTICE 11-13 (1971),
excerpted in ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR. ET AL., JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM
NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 18-19 (Jean Stefancic ed., 2d ed. 2002).
17 See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
18 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
19 See infra notes 22-78 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 79-131 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
22 "The things here forbidden are two-search and seizure. And not all searches nor
all seizures are forbidden, but only those that are unreasonable." Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 641 (1886). Searches conducted without a warrant are, subject to exception, "perse
unreasonable." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
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reasonableness rubric, the Supreme Court has used various interpretation-
al techniques and espoused myriad different tests. 3 Among these varying
tests, the Supreme Court has utilized three different standards to analyze
new surveillance technologies under the Fourth Amendment. The first
standard, originally elucidated in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v.
United States, states that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant when-
ever "a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as 'reasonable.' ' ' 24 The second standard, from Kyllo v. United States,
holds that when the surveillance technology used is "not in general pub-
lic use... the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant." 25 The third and final standard, expounded in numerous
drug-testing and roadblock cases, balances "the nature of the intrusion on
the individual's privacy against the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests ... beyond the normal need for law enforcement." 26 Each standard
has its advantages and disadvantages in the balancing act between privacy
and security, and this Note will address these in turn.
A. The Katz Reasonable-Expectation-of-Privacy Test
Despite its original presence in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz as op-
posed to appearing in the majority opinion, the "reasonable expectation
of privacy test" is the primary standard under which the Supreme Court
analyzes new law enforcement investigative techniques under the Fourth
Amendment.7 Katz and its progeny have the benefit of years of preceden-
tial weight behind them under which a number of thorny constitutional
issues have already been litigated. Additionally, the Katz test is somehow
intrinsically pleasing to the sense of balance between privacy and security.
The test's very subjectivity, which depends not just on individual subjec-
tive manifestations but the subjective manifestations of society in general
(as measured by the Supreme Court), essentially provides a constitutional
cover for the Court's application of nebulous principles of justice.
23 See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme
Court's Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1387 (2003).
24 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
25 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
26 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
829 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).
27 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) ("The warrantless search and
seizure of the garbage bags left at the curb outside the Greenwood house would violate the
Fourth Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in
their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable.").
2005- 2oo6 ]
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Despite the fact that legal realism takes that premise as a central tenet
of its jurisprudential philosophy,2s the ad hoc nature of the Katz test is a
serious cause of concern for commentators and even for the Supreme Court
itself: "[tihe Katz test ... has often been criticized as circular, and hence
subjective and unpredictable.' 29 The Katz test is frequently invoked to
find that a reasonable expectation of privacy does not exist, lending cre-
dence to the argument that its progeny are merely extemporized decisions
and that the test does little to protect privacy.3 The Supreme Court has
ruled under Katz that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
conversations conducted before a third party,3 ' his or her banking records, 32
the numbers dialed on his or her telephone,33 the location of his or her au-
tomobile,34 objects and actions observable from aerial surveillance, 35 or the
contents of his or her garbage placed on the street for pickup.36 Still, a more
pressing concern than the arguably limited privacy protections provided
by Katz is its near-total lack of guidance on whether the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to new technologies and investigative techniques. Due to
its somewhat unpredictable application, neither private citizens nor law
enforcement officers can be reasonably certain whether or not the Fourth
Amendment would require a warrant to issue prior to the use of a new tech-
nological device. Conceivably, this uncertainty provides for greater privacy
protection as law enforcement may be hesitant to utilize a new technology
absent a warrant for fear of having critical evidence declared inadmissible.37
Still, the lack of predictability in the Katz standard is potentially injurious
to national security. If law enforcement is to have the tools necessary to
28 See Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 49 (I931), excerpted in
HAYMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 195 ("But as the knowledge of rules is a very limited value
in the game of guessing future decisions, most legal rights and duties are extremely uncertain,
however certain and exact the legal rules.").
29 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (citing I WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(d) (3d ed.
1996)).
30 See Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DuQ. L. REV. 663,
675-76(2004).
31 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (197 '); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (decided prior to Katz).
32 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976), superseded by statute, Right to
Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 0978) (modified as amended at iz
U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (zooo)).
33 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1979).
34 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984).
35 SeeCalifornia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-14 (1986).
36 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988).
37 SeeWeeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,398-99 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (196I) (holding that evidence obtained unconstitutionally must be excluded in both
state and federal courts).
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combat terrorism, it would be useful to know whether or not a warrant is
required either by the Fourth Amendment or by statute. 3s
B. The Kyllo General-Public-Use Test
The second reasonableness standard seems specifically adapted to analysis
of emerging technologies under the Fourth Amendment. The Kyllo case
involved the use of a thermal imaging device to observe large heat lamps
used in a private residence to grow marijuana indoors.39 In a ruling that
seems tailored to application to new and emerging technology, the Court
held that searches with devices not in "general public use" are "presump-
tively unreasonable absent a warrant.'4 ° The advantages of such a standard
are fairly obvious. As opposed to the Katz standard which is subjective and
difficult to predict in its application4I the Kyllo test provides a line which is
"not only firm but also bright."42 Privacy protection is obviously paramount
in the Kyllo decision, yet the clarity of the rule avoids the perils of law
enforcement confusion that plague the Katz standard which is even less
protective of individual privacy. At first glance, then, the Kyllo standard ap-
pears perfectly suited as a Fourth Amendment rule for new technologies.
Of course, the impression provided by a "first glance" in the constitu-
tional context is misleading and impracticable. As an initial matter, the nar-
rowness of the holding frequently makes Kyllo inapposite.43 Therefore, the
decision's legitimacy as a strong constitutional doctrine is questionable. 44
38 In a number of cases, the Court's decisions that particular searches do not require
constitutional procedures have sparked Congressional responses requiring some form of
judicial authorization for the search. See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-
630,92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified as amended at IZ U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000)). For further
examples, see infra notes 83, 91, 95, and 97 and accompanying text.
39 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001). It is interesting to note that from a
scientific standpoint, no literal intrusion occurred in Kyllo. Thermal imagers, like millimeter-
wave imagers, parabolic microphones, and van Eck radiation detectors, are entirely passive in
nature, detecting only emanations which are "voluntarily provided." Stephen E. Henderson,
Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56
MERCER L. REv. 507, 535-38 (2oo5).
40 Kylo, 533 U.S. at 40.
41 See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
42 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
43 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 380 F3d 538, 544 (Ist Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
924 (2005), and reh'g denied, 125 S. Ct. 1379 (2005) (declining to extend Kyllo to cars); United
States v. Hatfield, 333 F3d 1 189, 1195 (ioth Cit. 2003) (distinguishing Kyllo from the visual
search of a fenced-in back yard); United States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361,364-66,366 n.2 (2d Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 908 (Kyllo inapplicable to a confidential informant's use of a covert
video camera).
44 The Court recently cited Kyllo for merely the second time in any context, for the ex-
press purpose of distinguishing it. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405,409 (2005). In Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004), the Court quoted from but did not rely upon Kyllo.
2oo5-2oo6]
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Still, even if Kyllo is accepted as constitutional writ, it contains a critical
limitation: the standard applies only to searches conducted within a home.
While it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas such as
telephone booths, automobiles, or even the curtilage and uncovered por-
tions of residences are at issue, in the case of the search of the interior of
homes-the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of pro-
tected privacy-there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common
law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowl-
edged to be reasonable.4S
It is on this basis-that Kyllo applies only to searches of the portions of a
home not visible or otherwise detectable from outside it-that courts have
refused to extend the doctrine. 46 Courts' refusal to apply Kyllo to general
circumstances makes it inapposite as a reliable and widely used test.47
There is an added dimension of difficulty in that the constitutional doc-
trine of Kyllo changes with the commonality of use of a particular technol-
ogy and not with the text of the Constitution or even with shifts in funda-
mental societal values. This presents a hurdle, albeit not an insurmountable
one, for judges favoring originalism as the primary method of constitutional
interpretation.48 There are at least two other constitutional doctrines that
either explicitly or implicitly depend on the nature of the technology in
present use. The most famous example comes from the Court's abortion
decisions in which fetal viability was determined to be the point at which
the state interest in protecting fetal life outweighs the individual right to
privacy.49 "To be sure,... there may be some medical developments that
affect the precise point of viability, but this is an imprecision within tol-
erable limits given that the medical community and all those who must
45 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
46 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 289 F Supp. 2d 230, 243 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (declining
to apply Kyllo to a device used to ascertain discrepancies between power flowing to a house
and the power use listed by the electrical meter outside the house); see also Caballes, 125 S.
Ct. at 838.
47 The distinction between privacy within and without a home is by no means an arbi-
trary one, as legal history dating to antiquity supports the proposition that "a man's house is his
castle." See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13-15 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1937), excerpted in
TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 4, at 7-8 (noting Biblical origins of special privacy protec-
tions for the home); seealso Entick v. Carrington, (1 765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) (striking down
a general search warrant of a home), cited with approval in Boyd v. United States, i I6 U.S. 616,
630 (1886).
48 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Onginalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,855 (1989).
That Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Kyllo presents an inescapable irony.
49 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-70
(1992) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
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apply its discoveries will continue to explore the matter.' 5 Another line of
cases in which technological development has altered constitutional law in-
volves the validity of prohibitions on "indecent" expression under the First
Amendment, as newer technology has increased the ability of individuals
to refrain from coming into contact with indecent communications as well
as the ability of parents to shield children from them.5' Thus, while it is
concededly disconcerting for a constitutional doctrine to be applied differ-
ently depending on the state of technology at the time a case is decided, it
is by no means a jurisprudential first.
C. The Legitimate Governmental Interests Test
The third and final standard which the Supreme Court could apply to ana-
lyze the reasonableness of new technologies under the Fourth Amendment
is the "legitimate governmental interests" test, also called the "special
needs" test. Simply stated, the test provides an exception to the ordinary
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for searches when they are con-
ducted, not for law enforcement purposes, but for some other special gov-
ernmental reason. 52 Such searches need not be supported by a warrant or
other judicial authorization, probable cause, exigent circumstances, or even
reasonable suspicion, but can in fact be completely suspicionless.53 Three
separate lines of cases support this standard: one relating to random drug
testing, another to checkpoints and roadblocks on public highways, and the
final one to searches of closely regulated spaces. In the first line of cases,
the Court has upheld random drug testing of train conductors,- Customs
Service agents,5 5 student participants in extracurricular sports,56 and student
participants in all extracurricular activities5 7 all in the interest of combating
illegal drug use and thereby increasing general public safety. In the second
line of cases, the Court has upheld or endorsed roadblocks or checkpoints
50 Id. at 870 (internal citations omitted).
51 Compare FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,749-50(1978) (holding that sanction of
a radio station for broadcasting indecency is constitutionally permissible), with Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 876-79 (1997) (holding that a law illegalizing the dissemination of indecency via
the Internet is unconstitutional).
52 "Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable,
is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers." New Jersey
v. TL.O., 469 U.S. 325,351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2ooo).
54 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
55 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,666 (1989).
56 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 4 7 J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).




conducting similarly random searches for illegal aliens,s5 drunk drivers,5 9
and unlicensed drivers,' also in the interest of public safety. However, the
Court drew the line at allowing a checkpoint for which the sole purpose was
to allow vehicles to be sniffed by a narcotics-detecting dog, since no special
need beyond the "general interest in crime control" was ascertainable.6 In
the third and final line of precedent following this balancing approach, the
Court has allowed warrantless searches on a general suspicion of probation-
ers' homes, 62 highly regulated businesses, 63 employee desks and offices, 64
students' property at school, 65 and prison inmates' body cavities.'
Strictly speaking, the precedents as they currently stand have little if
anything to do with the effect of new technology on the Fourth Amend-
ment. However, considering the noticeable effect that terrorism has had
on the national consciousness since the attacks of September I1, 2001, it is
certainly conceivable that a new "special need" in the form of national se-
curity could be proffered as a means to avoid inalysis under Katz or Kyllo. In
fact, in the Supreme Court's most recent case finding a warrantless search
to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the two dissenting Justices
indicated that they would have accepted the same search had it been justi-
fied by security concerns.6 7 Since the unpredictability of the evaluation of
new technology under the Fourth Amendment is the impetus to this Note,
and since unpredictability in thwarting future terrorist attacks is certainly
not a desirable attribute, this probable eventuality merits examination. If
national security were adopted as an acceptable alternative to law enforce-
ment interests, the legitimate governmental interest test would mean that
the use of surveillance technologies requiring a warrant under normal cir-
cumstances could be done without any judicial supervision, so long as it
were done in the interest of national security.68
58 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,566-67 (1976).
59 See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990).
60 See Delaware v. Prouse, 44o U.S. 648,663 (1979).
6I See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,41-42 (2000).
62 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-76 (1987).
63 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,699-703 (1987).
.64 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 72 I-z6 (1987) (plurality opinion).
65 See New Jersey v. TL.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985).
66 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979).
67 See Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 843 n.7 (zoo5) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("Unreasonable sniff searches for marijuana are not necessarily unreasonable sniff searches
for destructive or deadly material if suicide bombs are a societal risk."); id. at 847 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("The use of bomb-detection dogs to check vehicles for explosives without doubt
has a closer kinship to the [constitutional] sobriety checkpoints in Sitz than to the [unconsti-
tutional] drug checkpoints in Edmond.").
68 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,44(2000) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment




Needless to say, the assertion that the Constitution applies differently
in cases of national emergency presents a disquieting proposition for con-
stitutional law. From a historical perspective, however, this has sometimes
been the case. 9 Yet, from the same historical perspective, the Supreme
Court has often taken a dim view of such actions later affirming the validity
of constitutional rights during wartime.7o Legal scholars are divided on the
question of whether the Constitution should apply equally during times
of war or national emergency especially where its application could slow
law enforcement efforts or even forestall preventing the emergency from
occurring.71 Still, in general terms, Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated that
"[it is neither desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will oc-
cupy as favored a position in wartime as it does in peacetime."72 There is,
however, no direct legal precedent that war, national security, or terrorism
have any effect on the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in par-
ticular. The one Supreme Court case to squarely address the issue round-
ly denounced the proposition that the government could get around the
Fourth Amendment in the name of protecting national security, stating that
"Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic
security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the
Executive Branch." 73 Other recent cases seem to indicate a similar philoso-
phy.74 Contrarily, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
69 Common examples include Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus rights during
the Civil War, the Palmer raids during World War I, the Japanese internment camps during
World War II, and McCarthyism during the Cold War. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties:
Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to Domestic Law Enforcement, 5' UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1619-
21 (2004).
70 See, e.g., Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-24 (1866) (striking down Lincoln's
suspension of habeas corpus); see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
097) (per curiam) (holding that the suppression of classified documents concerning the
Vietnam conflict from publication was an unconstitutional prior restraint). Butsee Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (upholding the use of Japanese interment camps).
71 Compare Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (2004) (specifically endorsing the use of the special-needs
test in the context of a search for a nuclear weapon deployed somewhere in the United States),
with Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J.
18oi (2004) (generally arguing that the Constitution should not apply any differently during
times of war or national emergency).
72 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 224-25
(1998).
73 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972) (holding that the war-
rantless installation of a covert video recording device violates the Fourth Amendment).
Note that Katz explicitly reserved judgment on a national-security exception to the Fourth
Amendment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967).
74 See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (striking down a portion of the
USA PATRIOT Act authorizing a unique form of administrative subpoena called a "national
security letter"); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2oo4) (holding that the Constitution still
requires due process for American citizens captured in foreign countries and labeled enemy
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notably issued its first published opinion, and in that opinion it purposely
stated that a terrorist "emergency" qualifies under the "special needs test"
as it is "out of the realm of ordinary crime control."75 While it is true that
a court's first opinion may not hold much persuasive authority, the court
is populated by federal judges all of whom were appointed by the Chief
Justice76 and is therefore possibly quite persuasive indeed. 77
Suffice it to say that while the Supreme Court has never specifically cit-
ed national security concerns as a special need that would circumvent nor-
mal Fourth Amendment procedures, there are at least indications that such
an approach is possible. Assuming this is the case, what are the benefits of
the doctrine? Obviously, the clarity that it provides to law enforcement is
combatants). While Ashcroft certainly addressed Fourth Amendment issues, it did so in the
context of administrative subpoenas, which are ordinarily permissible so long as judicially
observed and the subpoena is for a "search" falling outside of the Fourth Amendment's pro-
tections. See Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
75 In re Sealed Case No. o2-oo, 31 o F3d 717, 745-46 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam),
abrogatingsub nom. In reAIl Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
218 E Supp. 2d 611 (FISA Ct. 2002).
76 See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (zooo). It is worth noting that the courts created by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 18oi-1829 (West 2004)) [herein'after FISA], are properly constituted Article
III courts, despite their judges' lack of lifetime tenure on the tribunals. See John J. Dvorske,
Validity, Construction, and Application of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (5o U.S.C.A.
§§ t8oi et seq.) Authorizing Electronic Surveillance of Foreign Powers and Their Agents, igo A.L.R.
FED. 385, § 5(a) (2005) (collecting cases).
77 On the other hand, annual reports filed by the U.S. attorney general under 50 U.S.C. §
1807 (2000) demonstrate the overwhelming deference shown to the government by the FISA
courts: between 1996 and 2004, onlyfour of 9,915 applications were denied. See Letter from
Janet Reno, U.S. attorney general, to L. Ralph Mecham, director, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts (Apr. 18, 1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/oipr/readingroom/fisaltr.htm;
Letter from Janet Reno, U.S. attorney general, to L. Ralph Mecham, director, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 29, 1998), http://www.usdoj.govloipr/readingroom/
97fisajltr.htm; Letter from Janet Reno, U.S. attorney general, to L. Ralph Mecham, direc-
tor, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 29, 1999), http://www.usdoj.
gov/oipr/readingroom/i998annualfisa reporttocongress.html; Letter from Janet Reno, U.S.
attorney general, to L. Ralph Mecham, director, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts (Apr. 27, 2oo), http://www.usdoj.gov/oipr/readingroom/99fisa-ltr.html; Letter from
John Ashcroft, U.S. attorney general, to L. Ralph Mecham, director, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts (Apr. 27, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/oipr/readingroom/2ooofisa-tr.
pdf; Letter from Larry Thompson, acting U.S. attorney general, to L. Ralph Mecham, di-
rector, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 29, 2002), http://www.usdoj.
gov/oipr/readingroom/2ooifisa-ltr.pdf; Letter from John Ashcroft, U.S. attorney general, to L.
Ralph Mecham, director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 29, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oipr/readingroomlzoozfisa-ltr.pdf; Letter from William E. Moschella,
assistant U.S. attorney general, to L. Ralph Mecham, director, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (Apr. 30, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/oipr/readingroom/2oo3fisa-ltr.pdf;
Letter from William E.Moschella, assistant U.S. attorney general, to L. Ralph Mecham, di-




head and shoulders above either the Katz or Kyllo tests. No interpretations
of societal expectations of privacy or commonality of technology are neces-
sary: risk to national security is the sole factor in determining whether a
new technology could be constitutionally used in an anti-terrorism case.
Unfortunately, the opposite side of the coin is just as clear: privacy protec-
tions, inadequate as some might interpret them under Katz or even Kyllo,
are virtually nonexistent under this version of the legitimate governmental
interests test. This is especially true when one considers that attacks on
constitutional protections are at their height during times of national emer-
gency,7s creating a high potential for abuse.
II. THE TEST CASE OF ELECTRONIC MAIL
Having laid out the three distinct constitutional standards that could be
used to scrutinize the reasonableness of emerging surveillance technology
under the Fourth Amendment, a concrete example is instructive. While
the different tests might seem relatively understandable in general, it is
only by understanding their usage in specific cases that the need for a new
and uniform standard truly becomes clear. For reasons stated below, 79 the
best technology to analyze the application of these three standards is the
interception of e-mail.
A. Brief History of the Regulation of
Communications Interception
One of the Supreme Court's first forays into the world of communications
interception came in 1928 when it held that wiretapping did not qualify as
a "search or seizure" under the Fourth Amendment because there was no
physical intrusion.Y° Congress responded with a total prohibition on wire-
tapping with the Federal Communications Act of 1934." After the Court
scrapped the trespass doctrine finding that "the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places,' 'sz some type of regulatory framework was neces-
78 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
79 See infra text accompanying notes io4-19.
80 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overrukd by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
81 See Federal Communications Act, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Star. 1103 (1934). However, in
practical terms the ban on communications interception was anything but total. Its applica-
tion was interpreted to have limited scope. See Richard C. Turkington, Protection for Invasions
of Conversational and Communication Privacy by Electronic Surveillance in Family, Marriage, and
Domestic Disputes under Federal and State Wiretap and Store [sic] Communications Acts and the
Common Law Privacy Intrusion Tort, 82 NEB. L. REv. 693, 701 (2oo4).
82 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967).
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sary to enable law enforcement to use wiretapping technology in a manner
consistent with notions of privacy and due process. Barely a year after the
Court's ruling in Katz, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act (OCCSSA), a3 Title III detailed the procedures for procur-
ing a warrant to lawfully intercept communications8 4 It quickly became
evident that the need for secrecy in investigations of foreign intelligence
agents required a different warrant procedure; thus, Congress enacted FISA
which provided an alternative to Title III warrants15 FISA has turned into
one of the government's primary weapons in investigating terrorism. 86
Roughly contemporaneous with the passage of FISA, the Supreme
Court handed down several decisions dealing with pen registers, first find-
ing that they fell outside the scope of Title 111,87 and shortly thereafter rul-
ing that they fell outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment itself.88 The
early i980s then ushered in the beginning of a new age of digital commu-
nications: the Internet and e-mail. What is presently known as the Internet
began as a i960s-era research project by the Advanced Research Projects
Agency called ARPANet. The purpose of ARPANet was to provide a com-
munications network that was resistant to nuclear attack. 9 In this manner,
ARPANet is the historical antecedent of what are today called "packet-
switched" communications networks as well as the direct predecessor of
the Internet. In such networks, an e-mail or other digital communication
is broken up into smaller "packets," each of which follows the "least cost
path" principle in finding the shortest and fastest route to its target bypass-
ing slow or malfunctioning message relay centers to be reconstituted at the
message destination. 9° Responding both to the Court's pen register deci-
sions and the unprecedented explosion of new communications technol-
ogy, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
in 1986. 9' ECPA substantially amended Title III of OCCSSA separating it
into three new provisions: Title I, which covers content interception ofelec-
'83 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 09-351, 82 Stat. 197-239
(1968) [hereinafter OCCSSA]. OCCSSA is also notable in that it was the first federal law to
provide block grants for law enforcement. See OCCSSA § 5 1o-i8 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 3760--64 (2000)).
84 See OCCSSA § 802 (codified as amended at I8 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2000)).
85 See FISA, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 18o-29, 18o2 (zooo)).
86 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 3 10 E3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
87 See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1977).
88 See Smith v. Maryland, 44z U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
89 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
90 Seegenerally Holland, supra note i i, at 17-18. It should be noted that this is a woefully
short and technically inaccurate description of the Internet, but it suffices for the purpose of
understanding the troubled status that electronic communications hold in the courts.




tronic communications,92 Title II, which regulates the acquisition of stored
communications, 93 and Title III, which governs the use of noncontent pen
registers and trap and trace devices.94
Congress would respond twice more to the growing demand for elec-
tronic surveillance in an increasingly technology-assisted world. In 1994, it
passed the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)
which partially amended ECPA and required telecommunications carriers
to cooperate with law enforcement by making their system architecture
amenable to easy tapping.95 CALEA was soon held to apply to Internet
service providers (ISPs) requiring them to install technology on their serv-
ers that would allow for the interception of digital packet-switched data. 96
Then came the tragic events of September I i, 2001 and the now-famous
congressional response, the nationalistically named USA PATRIOT Act. 97
The USA PATRIOT Act amended ECPA to include specific statutory au-
thorization to intercept packet-switched communications. 98 Despite the
objections of some commentators, such authorization had simply been in-
ferred prior to the USA PATRIOT amendment.99
Thus, the regulatory landscape of e-mail is at this point thoroughly
muddled. A law enforcement officer seeking to snoop through a suspected
terrorist's e-mail has the option of acquiring a Title I content warrant,'- a
Title II stored communications order,' °' a Title III pen register order,o2 or
a FISA warrant,0 3 all without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on warrantless searches. Unfortunately, as will be shown be-
low, the legal status of e-mail under the Fourth Amendment is not nearly
so cut and dried. If e-mail, a technology that has existed for decades and
92 See ECPA §§ IOi-i ! (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (2000)).
93 See ECPA § 201 (codified as amended at I8 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-11 (West 2004)). Some
courts speak instead of the Wiretap Act or the Stored Communications Act, which are actu-
ally references to ECPA Titles I and II, respectively. See TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 4,
at 23 1.
94 See ECPA § 301 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2ooo)).
95 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, io8
Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.) [here-
inafter CALEA].
96 See United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F3d 450,464-65 (D.C. Cir. 200o).
97 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter
USA PATRIOT].
98 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT § 216 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2000)).
99 See Thomas R. McCarthy, Don't Fear Carnivore: It Won't Devour Individual Privacy, 66
Mo. L. REv. 827, 842 (2001).
ioo See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2005).
ioi See §§ 2703(a)-(d).
102 See § 3123(a).
103 See o U.S.C. § 18o4(a) (2000).
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has been in increasingly common use in recent years, enjoys an uneasy
relationship with the Fourth Amendment, then there seems to be little
hope that emerging forms of technological surveillance will be uniformly
analyzed by the courts.
B. Why E-Mail is a Representative Test Case
As was previously stated, the Internet has exploded in popularity in Ameri-
can households' °4 and has become especially widespread in terrorist and
criminal endeavors and investigations. 105 Despite this rampant popularity,
the constitutional standards as applied to online communications are far
from clear. Courts, perhaps due to an inherent inability to think in purely
technological terms, have proven spectacularly ill suited to deal with pack-
et-switched communications interceptions. Some examples are in order.
The first cases to be examined deal not with constitutional questions
but address e-mail in the employment context. In an unreported tortious-
invasion-of-privacy case, a Microsoft employee was held not to have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in personal e-mails stored in password-pro-
tected folders on an office computer.'1 6 The plaintiff in another case had
been assured of the utter confidentiality of his e-mail communications by
his employer (the plaintiff was using a corporate e-mail address) yet was
still fired due to the content of those e-mails. In his suit for wrongful dis-
charge, the court held that an employee has no "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in the content of his e-mails from an employee to his supervisor.107
Again, while these are not constitutional cases, it is curious that the courts
used language similar to or lifted straight from Katz to describe the plain-
tiffs' e-mail privacy (or lack thereof, as the cases held). This represents a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of e-mail. If the plaintiffs in
the two cases had made the comments at issue on written letters sealed and
sent via a company interoffice memo network, it would be difficult to imag-
ine a court coming to the conclusion that they had no reasonable expecta-
104 See Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., A Nation Divided: Entering the Broadband
Age fig. 1 (2004), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/anol/NationOnlineBroadbando4.htm (by
October of 2003, 54.6% of U.S. households had Internet access, nearly three times the number
in October of 1997).
io5 See Hearings, supra note 13. The prevalence of Internet-based investigations is
somewhat conjectural. Compare United States v. Harvey, No. 5 1-4:02 CR 482JCHDDN, 2003
WL 22052993, at * 3 (E.D. Mo. July 28, 2oo3) (stating that the case involved only the second
request ever for a warrant under Title I of ECPA), with FEDERAL BUREAU oF INVESTIGATION,
CARNIvoREIDCS-Iooo REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2OO3), http://www.epic.orglprivacy/
carnivore/2oo3_report.pdf (indicating that FBI e-mail surveillance technology was authorized
under Title I twice in 2003, and under Title III six times).
io6 See McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05 -9 7-oo824-CV, 1999 WL 339015, at *4 (Tex.
App. May 28, 1999).
107 See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 E Supp. 97, ioi (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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tion of privacy in the contents of those sealed messages. The fact that the
messages could be viewed by those with the requisite technical expertise
should not change the fact that the plaintiff still had an expectation that
they would not be so viewed. As one court aptly noted, "[tihe mere pos-
sibility that interception of the communication is technologically feasible
does not render public a communication that is otherwise private."' 1S To
date, only one court has explicitly ruled that there exists a Fourth Amend-
ment reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of e-mailed mes-
sages. 1°9 However, probably because the decision was handed down by a
military appeals court, its use in the civilian courts has been rare." 0
Several other cases concern confusion with the methods of e-mail deliv-
ery, again indicating a basic misunderstanding of technological functional-
ity. First, at least two courts have ruled that under state statutory analogues
to ECPA, a sender of e-mail implicitly consents to its recording by law en-
forcement as e-mail is inherently a recorded medium (as opposed to verbal
conversations over a telephone line)."' The implication of such rulings is
clear: the interception of any digital communication to another computer
would be impliedly consented to, and therefore, the sender would have no
io8 State v. Townsend, 57 P.3d 255, 259'(Wash. 2002); see also Max Guirguis, Electronic
Mail Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 135, 153-54
(2003) ("Simply stated, the Court may use the lack of security during the transmission of
messages and the dramatic rise in hacking and computer crime as reasons to withhold Fourth
Amendment protection altogether from e-mail messaging. Though consistent with the Court's
holdings in the area of privacy, this rationale bases the reasonableness of the users' privacy
expectations almost exclusively on the drawbacks in the existing technology or on the limita-
tions of the informational infrastructure.").
io9 See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F 1996), aff'd 46 M.J. 413
(C.A.A.F 1997). Even this holding is itself limited, as the same court later held that ISP re-
cords of customers' visited websites were transactional records not protected from warrantless
searching by the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Allen, 53 M.J. 402,409 (C.A.A.F. 2ooo),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 907 (200'); Cf Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (bank transactional records fall out-
side the Fourth Amendment). Allen is yet another example of judicial misunderstanding of
technology, because even though web surfing is not literally identical to e-mail, from a techno-
logical standpoint the two are essentially indistinguishable-both methods of communication
involve nothing more than the exchange of packetized digital data.
i io Although Maxwell has been extensively cited in law journal articles and treatises,
only eight civilian courts have ever cited it, and none of them have gone so far as to fol-
low it, holding for various reasons that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
electronic communication in question. See, e.g., Townsend, 57 P.3d at 263; Commonwealth v.
Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 200 1), aff'dpercuriam without opinion, 837 A.2d 1163
(Pa. 2003) (per curiam).
i i i See Townsend, 57 P3d at 26o ("In sum, because Townsend, as a user of e-mail had to
understand.., that his e-mail messages would be recorded on the computer of the person to
whom the message was sent, he is properly deemed to have consented to the recording of
those messages."); Proetto, 771 A.2d at 829 ("Any reasonably intelligent person, savvy enough
to be using the Internet, however, would be aware of the fact that messages are received in a




reasonable expectation of privacy in the communication's contents. Such a
finding would be contrary to any contemporary notions of privacy" 2 as well
as congressional understanding." 3 In another case, federal agents seized
a computer that was being used as a message server storing messages for
later retrieval by an e-mail system's users. The contents of that computer
were seized under the less stringent provisions of Title II as they were seen
as stored communications.14 At first blush, this seems to be patently obvi-
ous. However, viewing all third party message servers as storage devices
for Title II purposes overlooks the entire nature of packet-switched net-
works such as the Internet. E-mails are not like telephone calls which are
terminated if the recipient does not respond. Unless an e-mail recipient's
computer is on and actively receiving packets at the time the e-mail arrives,
it must necessarily be placed in electronic storage on some third party's sys-
tem."5 The process can roughly be analogized to delivery of ordinary mail
via the U.S. Postal Service in which letters are considered in transit until
actually delivered." 6 Essentially, the court in the above case would label
a vast portion of the world's daily e-mail traffic as in storage rather than in
transit and therefore susceptible to interception under Title II of ECPA." 7
A similar and more recent ruling is potentially even more disastrous for
proponents of digital privacy. In United States v. Councilman, the First Cir-
cuit recently held that an ISP administrator who intercepted and copied
all e-mails to his customers originating from one of his competitors did
not violate Title I's prohibition on unauthorized interceptions because the
e-mails were, if only for a period measured in fractions of a second, in the
ISP's possession." As it stood, the Councilman decision signaled the end of
online communications privacy. It would allow law enforcement agents to
112 See Larry 0. Natt Gantt II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoring in
the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARv. J.L. & TEcH. 345, 347 (1995).
1 13 Given that Congress amended ECPA specifically to prohibit interception of packet-
switched communications without proper judicial authorization, see USA PATRIOT, supra
note 98, it is indeed bizarre that the courts would find that the Internet users had consented
to the interception of those communications.
114 See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 E3d 457, 458-59
(5th Cir. 1994).
115 See Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 E Supp. 1232, 1234 n.2 (D. Nev. 1996).
116 See generally Timothy Coughlan, Applying the U.S. Postal Service Statutes to E-Mail
Transmissions, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TEcH. L.J. 375 (1999).
117 See United States v. Smith, 155 F3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998) for an example of a
court that came to the conclusion that Titles I and II should be interpreted together and not
applied to different situations based on technical minutiae.
18 See United States v. Councilman, 373 F3d 197, 203-04 (1st Cir. 2004), reh'gen bane
granted, 385 E3d 793 (ist Cir. 2004), andvacated, 418 F.3 d 67 (1st Cir. 2005). Since there was no
contemporaneous interception, the defendant's actions fell outside the prohibitions of Title I
and were instead covered by Title II. See id. at 203 (citing Steve Jackson Games, 36 E3d. at 462).




access the contents of e-mail without a warrant in seemingly flagrant viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment because the courts have proven incapable
of adapting themselves to changing technological climes. The fact that the
court reheard the case en banc and reversed itself '19 is largely immaterial
to the underlying difficulty: courts have time and again proven themselves
incapable of resolving legal issues centered around new technological de-
velopments. It is in this context that e-mail monitoring, along with other
surveillance technologies, should be examined anew under the Fourth
Amendment. If a relatively stable and longstanding technology is subject
to such treatment, then there would appear to be little if any guidance on
how revolutionary new technologies will be treated by the courts.
C. The Carnivore Internet Monitoring Device
Due to the obvious need for a technology that assists law enforcement in
monitoring electronic communications, the FBI developed a device known
as Carnivore.' 20 Carnivore is capable of functioning in multiple modes, only
two of which need be addressed here: content interception mode, in which
the content of e-mail, online chatroom conversations, and website visits
is recorded, and noncontent addressing interception mode, in which the
"to:" and "from:" lines of e-mails and the website addresses visited are
recorded.' 21 Since Carnivore is precisely the type of device that should be
in mind when considering how the Fourth Amendment applies to techno-
logical breakthroughs, its capabilities will be examined under each of the
standards listed above.
If courts manage to avoid the Councilman pitfall of applying obsolete
statutory metaphors to new technology,' 2  modeling Carnivore as a trad-
I 19 See United States v. Councilman, 467 E3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
120 See Neil King, Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI's Wiretaps to Scan E-MailSpark Concern, WALL ST.
J., July 11, 2ooo, at A3. The specific hardware and software known as Carnivore (or DCSiooo,
the name adopted for Carnivore after it became public; see McCarthy, supra note 99, at 8z8 n.5 )
is no longer in use by the FBI, but commercial tools that better perform the same functions
as Carnivore have replaced it. See Ted Bridis, FBI Abandons Its Software for Online Wiretaps;
Bureau Switching to Commercial Snooping System, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 19, 2005, at 12.
121 See ILL. INS. OF TECH. RESEARCH INST., INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE
CARNIVORE SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT 3-24 to 3-28 (z0oo), http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/
carniv.final.pdf; see also Holland, supra note I I, at 6-I 2.
12 2 See Stephanie A. Gore, "A Rose by Any Other Name": Judicial Use of Metaphors for New
Technologies, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POIY 403,455 (2003):
Metaphors should be the jumping-off point for understanding new
technologies, not a substitute for such understanding. The challenge for
courts is to become more attentive in using metaphors to understand
new phenomena. As a number of commentators have advised, courts
and policymakers must take into account the differences between the




tional wiretapping device seems to fit squarely into the Katz and Kyllo re-
gimes. Under Kyllo, e-mail can certainly be said to be in general public use.
However, it is not the e-mail itself but Carnivore, an e-mail interception
device known as a packet sniffer,123 that is the relevant technological de-
vice. This is precisely the difficulty that lies in applying Kyllo: determining
at what point a device, which is undeniably publicly available,'2 4 becomes
a device in general public use. A similar problem applies when analyzing
Carnivore as a content interception device under Katz. That society exhib-
its a subjective expectation of privacy in the content of its e-mails is incon-
trovertible, but whether it views that expectation as reasonable based on
the fact that competent technicians can in fact access its e-mails at any time
can certainly be called into doubt.'2 5 An even larger unknown is whether
the Supreme Court would find society's privacy expectation to be reason-
able. The question then becomes whether a person can have a reasonable
expectation of privacy when using a technology known to be capable of
interception. , 6 Since all forms of communication are susceptible to some
type of unwanted third party interception, it would seem that Katz would
require a warrant to intercept the contents of e-mail communications, but
the fact remains that the constitutional issue has never been directly ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court. This lack of clarity on such a basic issue is
precisely why a new standard is necessary.
Analyzing Carnivore as a pen register device is even more complicated
under either Katz or Kyllo. It should be noted that there is considerable dis-
sent over the basic issue of the Fourth Amendment's inapplicability to pen
registers, as several state appellate courts have ruled that their state consti-
tutions provide broader protections than the Fourth Amendment and have
embraced a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information gleaned
See also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, toz MIcH. L. REv. 8o1, 875-76 (2004) ("Judges struggle to understand even
the basic facts of [new] technologies, and often must rely on the crutch of questionable meta-
phors to aid their comprehension.").
123 See supra note i I and accompanying text.
124 Packet sniffers are routine tools for network maintenance, entirely unrelated to their
possible uses as snooping devices. See WIKIPEDIA, PACKET SNIFFERS, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Packet.sniffer (last visited Sept. 27, 2005).
125 But see Helen W. Gunnarsson, Should Lawyers Use E-Mailto Communicate with Clients?,
92 ILL. B.J. 572, 572-75 (2004) (citing with approval ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Protecting the Confidentiality of Unencrypted E-Mail, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999)
("A lawyer may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by unencrypted
e-mail sent over the Internet without violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(1998) because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a tech-
nological and legal standpoint.") (emphasis added)).
126 The Court has exhibited some receptiveness to the argument that the mere possibil-
ity of loss of privacy eliminates the reasonableness of an expectation thereof. See California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (I988).
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by pen register devices. 27 Carnivore merely exacerbates this controversy
because the "pen register" information it records is often much more con-
tent-like than the dialed numbers intercepted under a traditional pen reg-
ister and reveals significantly more information about the person.2' The
same difficulties with applying the Ky&l test to content interceptions of e-
mail apply to Carnivore's pen register mode, but the Katz analysis is some-
what different due to the Supreme Court's prior rulings on pen registers. 19
Since the Court accepts as a given that information voluntarily turned over
to a third party even for specifically limited purposes is constitutionally
unprotected, the Katz analysis is over. However, if the Court could be con-
vinced that "routing" and "addressing" 130 information of the type collected
by Carnivore in pen mode were of a type creating a reasonable expectation
of privacy, then the same intractable difficulties that applied in the content
interception stage once again apply. In short, under both Katz and Kyllo, it is
at best difficult to predict just how the Fourth Amendment will be applied
to new technologies.
It would seem then that the only existing solution that would provide
adequate guidance on either of Carnivore's operational modes or on any
other new surveillance technologies would be the national security spe-
cial needs test. Unfortunately, accepting national security as a legitimate
governmental interest eviscerates privacy. 3'1 While the lack of clarity and
guidance to law enforcement on future technologies inherent in the Katz
and Kyllo tests is eliminated in the legitimate governmental interests test,
the lack of privacy protections and potential for abuse become even greater
when concerning a technology as widespread as e-mail. Thus, it appears
that none of the three Fourth Amendment standards adequately balances
127 See People v. Blair, 6oz P.2d 738, 746-47 (Cal. 1979); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.ad
135, 141 (Colo. 1983); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 956-57 (N.J. 1982); Richardson v. State,
865 S.W.zd 944,954 (Tex. Crim. App. i993); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (Wash. 1986).
Not all states take such an approach. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Knopf, 847 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Ky. 1992)
(holding that Section to of the Kentucky Constitution is "interpreted coextensively" with the
Fourth Amendment).
128 See Holland, supra note i i, at 37-39. This point is best shown by comparing telephone
pen register information to electronic routing pen register information in the following
example. Assume that John Doe is the target of an FBI investigation, with both a traditional
telephone pen register and a Carnivore-like pen register recording his actions. Were Doe to
call a bookstore to order a book, the only information gained by the FBI would be that Doe
dialed the bookstore's number at a certain time. However, if Doe instead visited an online
bookseller to order the same book, Carnivore would record every separate page visited, thus
allowing the FBI to discover every piece of information that Doe looked at (including the type
of book that Doe is generally interested in), in addition to what book he actually purchased.
Title III's characterization of this as noncontent information is strikingly flawed. Contra 18
U.S.C. § 312 I(c) (2000).
129 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
130 See § 3121(c).
131 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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privacy and security. If both privacy and security are to be protected in light
of the Fourth Amendment, a new constitutional doctrine is in order.
III. PROPOSAL FOR A MERGED FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARD
TO APPLY TO EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
This Note proposes a new merged standard combining the best aspects
of the three aforementioned doctrines. The merged standard applies dif-
fering constitutional standards at three separate stages. In the first stage,
when a technology is truly new (in other words, when it has seen no or ex-
tremely limited public availability)' 32 the use of that technology to conduct
surveillance would be analyzed under a Kyllo-like approach but one that
applies not just to homes. Put in different terms, when a new surveillance
technology is first emerging, it cannot be used without a warrant. Once
the technology becomes relatively common, a modified version of the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test is applied in the second stage. For all
its faults, Katz is bound up in years of precedent, and scrapping a decades-
old constitutional doctrine in the interests of greater predictability would
be counterintuitive. However, here the Katz test would be applied with
considerably more deference to privacy by focusing on actual societal mani-
festations of an expectation of privacy rather than on the objective criteria
on which the expectation is currently gauged. 33 Finally, the third stage: the
technological surveillance technique has passed into frequent usage by the
public, causing the expectation of privacy from such a technique to be con-
sidered per se unreasonable and allowing such searches to be conducted
entirely outside the Fourth Amendment.
The multiple stages of scrutiny set forth above are only the first of two
major elements of the merged standard. While the first element incorpo-
rates aspects of the Katz and Kyllo tests and is aimed at maximizing pri-
vacy, the second element integrates the special needs test into the first
element and is aimed at maximizing security. In each stage of the merged
132 "Public" as used in this context simply means non-law enforcement and intelligence
officials.
133 Again, Justice Harlan's reasonableness test had two factors: "first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The plain import of this language is that an individual's
subjective expectation of privacy must be supported by society's concurrence in order for that
expectation to be reasonable. However, the Court has morphed this into a requirement that
both individual and societal expectations of privacy be objectively reasonable. "An expecta-
tion of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection, however, unless society
is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable." California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988) (emphasis added); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209-10




standard, a separate analysis applies when national security is the asserted
justification for the use of the search technology. At the first stage, when
the constitutional privacy protections are at their peak, there is obviously a
concurrent necessity for adequate security protections. Therefore, if search
technologies new enough to require a warrant in ordinary investigations
are used in a national security context, a rebuttable presumption arises that
the search is reasonable. Essentially, in the first stage any national security
search conducted without a warrant is saved from an arbitrary finding of
unconstitutionality by this presumption, albeit one that can be overcome to
prevent its abuse when the justification is merely pretextual. In the second
stage, the Katz-like analysis does not give rise to nearly as high a require-
ment for a security exemption as existed in the first stage. Consequently,
instead of an automatic rebuttable presumption of constitutionality, a secu-
rity-justified search using second stage technology would only require such
a presumption when the societal expectation of privacy is neither clearly
present nor clearly non-existent. The rebuttability of the presumption
would still provide protection for privacy when the national security justi-
fication was pretextual, and the added requirement that the expectation of
privacy be doubtful ab initio further protects individuals from rationalized
encroachments on their privacy. '34 Finally, in the third stage of the merged
standard the complete exception of the search technology from the Fourth
Amendment simultaneously eliminates the need for any special security
analysis.
There are several benefits to using the merged standard above. First
and foremost, the standard would be known and more predictable, whereas
currently the Supreme Court could apply any one of three possible stan-
dards without much if any warning. Additionally, the standard balances
both privacy and security in a way that allows them primacy over the other
only when such prevalence would be based on objectively identifiable fac-
tors and not according to shifting societal views of privacy.'35 A constitu-
134 Of course, protection of individual privacy and assurance of national security are not
the only considerations of the security aspect of the merged standard. Protection of sources
and methods of intelligence gathering is also of critical import. It is for reasons such as this
that the President's authority to conduct warrantless searches in the gathering of foreign
intelligence had been recognized prior to the enactment of FISA. See United States v. Truong,
629 E2d 908, 913-14 (4th Cir. 198o) (warrantless searches that took place prior to FISA's 1978
enactment not unconstitutional). FISA was passed in part because of the need for a "secure
framework by which the Executive Branch may conduct legitimate electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes within the context of this Nation's commitment to privacy and
individual rights." S. REP. No. 95-604, at 15 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904,
3916; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1803(c) (2ooo). Therefore, it would seem that requiring any security
analysis under the merged standard to be raised exclusively in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court would be the only way to adequately safeguard national secrets.
135 Arguably, any Kyllo-like analysis suffers from a similar defect, making an expecta-
tion of privacy dependent upon "market forces," in effect substituting "substantial sales" for
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tional expectation of privacy dependent upon the present state of tech-
nology would create a much more rational correlation between subjective
expectations and those recognized by the Court. Since courts have proven
themselves ill suited to rule on technologies so new that the general public
does not understand them, the merged standard eliminates the necessity
of judicial understanding of the underlying technology.36 A court need not
know how e-mail travels on a packet-switched network in order to under-
stand that packet sniffers are not in frequent everyday use but are readily
publicly available and that their use must therefore be subject to a second
stage Katz-like finding of reasonableness. Finally, concentrating a reason-
ableness finding on societal recognitions of privacy would return Fourth
Amendment analysis to what Justice Harlan actually stated in Katz as op-
posed to the objective standard of more recent cases.' 37
Of course, there are certainly problems to be resolved with the merged
standard. First, it suffers from the same defect as the Kyllo test yet ampli-
fied: determining at what exact point a technology passes into "common"
and "frequent" use. However, under the merged standard these are evi-
dentiary difficulties as opposed to the definitional ambiguity in the Kyllo
"general public use" standard.'38 Also, the merged standard is undeniably
more intrinsically complicated than any of the three current doctrines are
separately. More complicated does not necessarily mean more precise.
Since, as a general rule, clearer rules provide for more predictable deci-
sions,' 39 courts should strive for clarity in their decisions. However, despite
the merged standard's complexity, its utilization of observable distinc-
tions between different classes of cases makes for an overall doctrine that
is clearer than the combination of possible Fourth Amendment analyses
currently used. Still, the main point on which the merged standard could
be assailed is its national security search exemption aspect, as such solici-
societal expectations. William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 102-03 (2O02). This is certainly a valid critique of Kyllo within the Katz
framework, but its efficacy would actually be an argument in favor of the merged standard's
approach. "Substantial sales" cannot occur without generalized public consent, generating
precisely the type of verifiable indicia of public usage that the merged standard looks for in
categorizing a technology.
136 To be sure, the fact that a judge is personally competent in the use of some type of
technology would seem to indicate a higher level of societal use than is required in the first
stage. However, personal judicial familiarity would be unnecessary, as statistical data and ex-
pert testimony could fairly accurately demonstrate the level of public use. Similarly, judicial
awareness of a particular technology may lead to the use of judicial notice to determine in
which stage of the merged standard the technology lies. See generally FED. R. EVID. 201.
137 See supra note 133.
138 See supra notes 135-36.
139 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CM. L. REv. 1175, 1179
(1989) (noting that clear rules enhance predictability, an essential aspect of the rule of law).
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tousness towards governmental powers is unsettling.14 Unfortunately, an
adequate balance between privacy and safety necessarily requires some
consideration of security accommodations. The benefit of the security
facet of the merged standard is that it is both surmountable and inher-
ently conditional in contrast to the categorical national security exception
that the current legitimate governmental interests test could give rise to.
The potential for abuse under the latter standard is clear while the former
presents significant hurdles to possible exploitation of a security loophole
in the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the total lack of constitutional privacy
protections in the third stage could be seen as a major deficiency, but the
purpose of the third stage abrogation is to allow societal expectations of pri-
vacy to express themselves via Congress in the form of privacy-protecting
legislation. In this manner, privacy advocates need not fear nullification of
Fourth Amendment rights with every shift in the Court's membership. If
American society truly values a certain aspect of privacy, they can depend
on their elected representatives to protect it rather than an often unpredict-
able judiciary.'4'
IV. CONCLUSION: THE NECESSITY FOR A MIDDLE GROUND
This Note emphasizes the necessity of clear guidance on Fourth Amend-
ment treatment of new technology. Predictability is key for two reasons.
Americans' privacy interest is one key reason: if we are to be snooped upon,
we would prefer to know the circumstances under which snooping may oc-
cur. However, clarity and predictability in this area are most critical to law
enforcement agencies, a fact that is best explained by relating past events.
In early 2ooo, FBI agents investigating an American terrorist cell associated
with Osama bin Laden were using Carnivore to track the cell's online com-
munications. 142 One day, Carnivore somehow malfunctioned and intercept-
ed the e-mails of people who were not targets of the investigation. Perhaps
140 See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
141 "Some delay in the law is understandable given that the law is reactive and
legislatures ... cannot anticipate all the problems associated with new.., technologies."
Gantt, supra note 112, at 347-48. Despite what can sometimes be a ponderously slow
legislative response, the fact remains that Congress has seen fit to respond to technological
developments numerous times. See supra notes 38, 83, 91, 95, and 97 and accompanying text;
see also Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, Pub. L. No.
1o8-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (codified at scattered sections of Titles 15, i8, & 28 U.S.C.).
142 See Memorandum from [name redacted], Dep't of Justice Office of Intelligence Policy
and Review, to Marion Bowman, FBI Assoc. Gen. Counsel for Nat'l Sec. Affairs (Apr. 5, 2000),
http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/fisa.html [hereinafter Memo]; see also Press Release,
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., FBI's Carnivore System Disrupted Anti-Terror Investigation (May 28,
2002), http://www.epic.orgIprivacy/carnivore/5_o2_release.html (explaining acronyms in and
background information pertaining to the memorandum).
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believing this to have violated the statutory minimization requirement'43
and thus rendering all the properly intercepted data inadmissible,' 44 the
law enforcement official running the Carnivore device at that time erased
all the intercepted e-mails.'14 We will never know what intelligence was
contained in those e-mails including whether it could have provided warn-
ing of future terrorist attacks. We will also never know whether a court
would have allowed the already-intercepted e-mails to be entered into evi-
dence.146 What matters is that the courts' lack of predictability on Fourth
Amendment matters was a direct cause of the loss of potentially vital na-
tional security information. If national security is to be protected, both pri-
vate citizens and law enforcement must be at least generally aware of how
the courts treat technology under the Fourth Amendment. The merged
standard is designed, at least in part, to eliminate any possible confusion
and make it impossible for another mishap like that noted above to occur.
A few specific examples should illustrate the workings of the merged
standard. Search technologies such as the Kyllo thermal imagers or Voice
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) surveillance devices' 47 can be considered pro-
totypical first stage technologies, while packet sniffers like Carnivore are
properly categorized as second stage devices due to their relative common-
ality in the private sector.' 48 Thus, while electronic surveillance of VolP
conversations would necessarily require a warrant, snooping on e-mail, in-
stant messaging, and other forms of packetized communications would be
analyzed under the merged standard's modified Katz test. In the interests
of clarity, it should be made apparent that under this version of the Katz
143 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 18oi(h), 18o4(a)(5) (zooo). Title I contains similar minimization
requirements; see I8 U.S.C. § 25 18(5) (zooo).
144 Cf. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. iz8, 139-43 (1978) (holding that minimization
requirements are aspects of Fourth Amendment reasonableness and are to be determined
in a multifactor analysis). This decision has been highly criticized for failing to adequately
protect privacy. See TRKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 4, at 308-09 (citing Michael Goldsmith,
The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 97-112 (1983)).
145 See Memo, supra note 142.
146 It is worth noting that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to evidence obtained in
violation of Title III, as pen registers are not covered by the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v.
Maryland, 44z U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979). Curiously, while the constitutional exclusionary rule
does apply to evidence taken in violation of Title I, there is also an explicit statutory exclu-
sionary rule applicable to Title I. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2000). Title III, by contrast, contains no
comparable statutory exclusion.
147 VoIP is a relatively recent communications tool allowing for Internet telephony. The
FCC is considering making VoIP providers subject to CALEA. See Proposed Rules, 69 Fed.
Reg. 56,976, at 56,977-79 (Sept. 23, zoo4) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 22, 24, and 64). The
FCC is already cooperating with Internet security specialists to develop a suitable form of
VolP wiretap. See Stephen Labaton, FC.C. Supports Surveillance Rules on Internet Calls, N.Y
TiMEs, Aug. 5, 2oo4, at CI.
148 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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reasonableness test, both content and non-content "addressing" Internet
communications would be subject to Fourth Amendment protections. 149
Breath-analysis sobriety tests and narcotics- and explosive-detecting ca-
nines (as well as their obvious electronic analogues)'15 present a contrary
conclusion due to the well-known permissibility of their use by law en-
forcement. 15' While there is generally a subjective reasonable expectation
of privacy for automobile trunks,' 52 the fact that the public is largely aware
of capabilities of sobriety tests and drug-sniffing dogs vitiates against that
same expectation being applied to sniffing searches. 53 Lastly, the "fre-
quent" use envisioned for third stage technologies would include only
widely used tools such as digital cameras, answering machines, and binocu-
lars, as well as low or no-tech surveillance techniques (for example, putting
a glass to the wall in order to hear conversations occurring on the other side
of it). 5 The critical distinction between third-stage devices and practices
and those from which an expectation of privacy is lacking in the second
149 Applying the more privacy-oriented version of the Katz reasonableness test, seesupra
note 133 and accompanying text, individual and collective expectations of privacy in Internet
communications are judged based on objectively verifiable manifestations, see, e.g., supra note
125, but are not subject to any further objective standards of reasonableness. Cf. supra note
io8 and accompanying text.
15o See Richard J. Colton & John N. Russell, Jr., Making the World a Safer Place, SCIENCE,
Feb. z8, 2003, at 1324 (noting chemical, biological, and radiological detectors in regular use at
airports and major events).
151 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (mandatory breathalyzer
testing based on a police officer's reasonable suspicion of drunken driving not prohibited by
Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (drug-sniffing
canine use is sui generis in that it "discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a
contraband item"); accord Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005) (citing Place in holding
that sniff searches do not "implicate legitimate privacy interests").
152 But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978) ("[T]he trunk of an
automobile... [is an area] in which a passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have
a legitimate expectation of privacy.").
153 However, the fact that the public is aware of the possibility that a communication will
be intercepted is by no means determinative in finding a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Cordless and cellular phones are illustrative on this point. It is generally understood that the
technology to eavesdrop on cordless and cellular phone conversations is widely available.
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 522 n.6 (2oo) ("[Clalls placed on cellular and cordless
telephones can be intercepted more easily than those placed on traditional phones."); State v.
McVeigh, 620 A.zd 133, 147 (Conn. 1993) ("[C1ordless telephone conversations.., are readily
receivable by such commonplace items as ordinary television sets, baby monitors and other
cordless telephones."). Still, a reasonable expectation of privacy in such communications
clearly exists. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 524 (noting that ECPA was expanded by CALEA to
include both cordless and cellular phone conversations); United States v. bin Laden, 126 F.
Supp. 2d 264, z8I (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
cellular phone conversations).
154 Contra People v. Arno, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624,625 (1979) ("[T]he use of optical aids in the
nature of binoculars, telescopes and the like is not itself determinative of the admissibility in
evidence of the product of the observation....").
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stage is the regularity of use by private individuals as opposed to by law
enforcement officials. 55
Balancing privacy and security is no easy task. Legislatures, the courts,
and commentators have attempted to find the proper balance for years, yet
no universally accepted solution has yet been found. This merged standard
of Fourth Amendment application to emerging technologies is far from
comprehensive when it comes to the overall privacy-security balance. Still,
any tool that would allow greater clarity in the law while preserving the
flexibility that is so abundantly necessary in the law enforcement arena
seems to be one which is moving in the right direction, in terms of the pri-
vacy-security balancing act. Effective Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
must sometimes allow privacy to trump security and vice versa, but the sit-
uations in which one or the other may occur must not be declared accord-
ing to nebulous political values.'56 Neither privacy nor security can always
be favored because this would result in the other being abrogated to lesser
status. The merged standard adopts a middle ground that will avoid this
thereby strengthening attention to both privacy and security interests.
155 Note that while functionally speaking, there is little difference between these two
areas, as neither is protected by the Fourth Amendment, there is an analytical justification for
separating them. In the second stage's modified Katz analysis, if an individual does not pos-
sess a reasonable expectation of privacy from some surveillance mechanism, the chance will
always exist that shifts in the state of the device's usage level will lead to its recategorization.
In contrast, once a technology's commonality of use is sufficient to justify its inclusion in the
third stage, any Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy is permanently revoked, making
statutory protection the only alternative. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
156 "Building on the special-needs cases would provide continuity of precedent and
greater protection of individual privacy than would the construction of an entirely new and
ad hoc catastrophic-threat or national-security exception to probable-cause requirements."
Gould & Stern, supra note 71, at 831-32. Similarly, the merged standard approach would be
less categorical than a special needs national security exception analysis, providing even more
privacy protection.
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